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Separation, Neutrality, and Clergy Liability for  
Sexual Misconduct 
William P. Marshall.∗  
Immediately after a church service, a cleric approaches a woman 
congregant (whom he knows only through her attendance at church 
services) and asks her to meet with him in his church office. During that 
meeting, he raises with her the importance of their faith and religious 
tradition and tells her that if she were a true believer, she would agree 
to give him physical comfort in order to provide him the strength 
necessary to pursue his religious mission.1 She agrees to the sexual 
relationship. Some time later, she develops anxiety and other 
psychological ills as a result of her guilt and stress surrounding this 
relationship. Eventually, she sues him in civil court for violating his 
fiduciary duty to her as her minister. Should the court recognize her 
claim, or should her action be dismissed as violative of the religion 
clauses of the First Amendment? 
I. INTRODUCTION
The issues raised by the foregoing hypothetical are as intricate 
and as troubling as any that exist in the area of law and religion.2 
Whether, or when, clergy and religious institutions should be liable 
for sexual misconduct3 is a question as politically charged as it is 
complex, involving matters as diverse as defining the scope of 
vicarious corporate liability, mapping the constitutional boundaries 
in the relations between church and state, and exploring the power 
∗ Kenan Professor of Law, University of North Carolina. I am grateful to Winston 
Bowman for his research. 
1. The facts of this hypothetical are loosely based upon some of the events depicted in
the fictional motion picture The Apostle (Universal Pictures 1997). 
2. I use the example of a male cleric and a female congregant in this Article, although
the same legal issues could arise if the gender roles were interchanged . 
3. The use of the term “misconduct” in this regard may be misleading. “Misconduct”
assumes that the actor has engaged in wrongdoing and in that sense appears to anticipate the 
result of our inquiry: has the cleric done something actionable? The use of “misconduct” in 
this Article, however, is not intended to convey a legal conclusion but is intended to describe 
only conduct that is morally or ethically suspect. 
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imbalances inherent in consensual sexual relations between group 
leaders and followers. There are no easy ways to balance the many 
competing interests at stake, and there are no easy answers. 
Professors Ira C. Lupu and Robert W. Tuttle, however, take on 
the considerable challenges posed by the clergy and church sexual 
misconduct question in their remarkable paper, Sexual Misconduct 
and Ecclesiastical Immunity.4 It is an outstanding work. Despite the 
difficulties inherent in their project, Professors Lupu and Tuttle 
address the numerous issues at stake with exceptional dispassion and 
rigor, and they do not shy away from making the hard decisions. 
Their solutions, I am sure, will not fully satisfy any of the competing 
interests involved.5 No one, however, will fairly be able to criticize 
the power and honesty of their arguments.6
Nevertheless, one of the matters over which Professors Lupu and 
Tuttle are likely to generate criticism is their response to the question 
posed in our introductory hypothetical—should the civil courts 
recognize a breach of fiduciary duty claim for sexual misconduct 
against a cleric brought by one of his adult congregants?7 To 
Professors Lupu and Tuttle, the answer is no (unless the cleric is 
acting, in effect, as a secular therapist)8—on the basis of what is, 
4. Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, Sexual Misconduct and Ecclesiastical Immunity,
2004 BYU L. REV. 1789. 
5. Those pursuing misconduct claims against clergy and religious institutions will likely
find the authors’ approach too protective of religious interests. See, e.g., Zanita E. Fenton, 
Faith in Justice: Fiduciaries, Malpractice and Sexual Abuse by Clergy, 8 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 
45 (2001); Janice D. Villiers, Clergy Malpractice Revisited: Liability for Sexual Misconduct in 
the Counseling Relationship, 74 DENV. U. L. REV. 1 (1996). Those defending clergy and 
religious institutions are likely to believe that the authors’ approach will too readily permit 
liability. See, e.g., Mark E. Chopko, Stating Claims Against Religious Institutions, 44 B.C. L. 
REV. 1089 (2003); Patrick J. Schiltz, The Impact of Clergy Sexual Misconduct on Religious 
Liberty, 44 B.C. L. Rev. 949 (2003). 
6. Actually, the fact that Professors Lupu and Tuttle are likely to please no one is only
a testament to the integrity of their thinking and the difficulty of their mission. Law and 
religion issues do not lend themselves to easy answers. Religion clause jurisprudence is beset 
with inherent contradiction—from its intrinsic tension between the First Amendment’s Free 
Exercise and Establishment clauses to its inherent irony that merely setting forth a 
constitutional definition of “religion” can run afoul of the first amendment values at stake. 
One should therefore expect that a balanced assessment of the issues surrounding the liability 
of church and clergy for sexual misconduct will not lead to one-sided results but would rather 
reflect the contradictions that pervade religion clause jurisprudence generally. 
7. Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 4, at 1832.
8. Id. While the authors would allow liability in circumstances where the cleric has
acted in the capacity of a therapist or counselor, the key to liability for the authors is that “[a] 
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essentially, a jurisdictional ground. They contend that submitting the 
clergy-congregant sexual misconduct issue to civil courts violates 
structural concerns of church-state separation9 because it requires 
judges to investigate the religious significance of the clergy-
congregant relationship and therefore improperly enmeshes the civil 
courts in resolving internal church issues such as the meaning of a 
sect’s theology or the nature of its polity.10 Such matters, according 
to Professors Lupu and Tuttle, are simply beyond the civil courts’ 
competence.11
Professors Lupu and Tuttle’s conclusion that clergy should not 
be liable for sexual misconduct with adult congregants is, of course, 
controversial in result. Some courts and commentators, for example, 
have taken precisely the opposite view and have suggested that 
fiduciary liability may arise from the religious quality of the clergy-
congregant relationship.12 The authors’ reasoning, however, is also 
controversial because it is based on a premise that is the exception in 
contemporary religion clause jurisprudence.13 Generally, as Lupu and 
Tuttle note,14 First Amendment law posits that religion and 
nonreligion are indistinct for constitutional purposes (the 
“neutrality” or “equality” model).15 Accordingly, the central 
fiduciary relationship between clergy and congregant must be grounded in something other 
than its religious character.” Id. At 1828. 
9. For purposes of brevity, I will refer to this theory as that of “structural-separation.”
10. Id. at 1820–32.
11. Id. at 1825.
12. See F.G. v. MacDonnell, 696 A.2d 697 (N.J. 1997) (allowing a sexual misconduct
claim against a cleric based upon breach of fiduciary duty); Fenton, supra note 5 (arguing that 
clergy should be liable in such circumstances); Villiers, supra note 5 (same). 
13. As will be discussed, Professors Lupu and Tuttle’s approach is also controversial in
its claim that it is based on jurisdictional concerns and therefore absolute in application. See 
infra notes 39–66 and accompanying text. 
14. Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 4, at 1802.
15. Id. at 1802–03; Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, The Distinctive Place of Religious
Entities in our Constitutional Order, 47 VILL. L. REV. 37, 78–79 (2002) (noting that 
neutrality has become the dominant mode of religion clause analysis). Identifying the problems 
associated with according religion a distinct legal status has also been a major part of my own 
work. See William P. Marshall, What Is the Matter With Equality? An Assessment of the Equal 
Treatment of Religion and Non-religion in First Amendment Jurisprudence, 75 IND. L.J. 193 
(2000); William P. Marshall, In Defense of Smith and Free Exercise Revisionism, 58 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 308 (1991); see also Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, The Vulnerability of 
Conscience: The Constitutional Basis for Protecting Religious Conduct, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 1245 
(1994); Frederick Mark Gedicks, An Unfirm Foundation: The Regrettable Indefensibility of 
Religious Exemptions, 20 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J. 555 (1998); Eugene Volokh, Equal 
Treatment Is Not Establishment, 13 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 341 (1999). 
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constitutional inquiry is whether religion and nonreligion are being 
treated equally with respect to the matter at hand.16 Thus, in the case 
of the clergy-congregant sexual misconduct issue, the neutrality 
model would simply inquire whether leaders of nonreligious 
organizations would be subject to liability for similar conduct with 
their members. Professors Lupu and Tuttle’s structural-separation 
model, however, is premised on the notion that religion should be 
considered constitutionally distinct with respect to clergy-congregant 
sexual misconduct cases. How a neutrality analysis would resolve 
such cases is therefore irrelevant to their analysis. Rather, it is a 
competing way to understand the question. 
Professors Lupu and Tuttle are on solid ground in noting that in 
some areas the Court continues to treat religion and nonreligion as 
constitutionally distinct17 and that the movement to the 
religion/nonreligion equality model has been “incomplete.”18 They 
are also correct in their assertion that matters requiring state 
mediation of internal religious matters have generally been 
considered an appropriate exception to the neutrality model.19 That 
16. Thus, in Free Exercise and Free Speech cases, the Court’s central inquiry has been
whether religion has been singled out for disfavored treatment. See Church of the Lukumi 
Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993) (considering the disfavored 
treatment of religion under free exercise); Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of 
Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995) (considering the disfavored treatment of religion under free speech). 
Meanwhile, in the Establishment Clause arena the question has been whether religion has been 
improperly singled out for favored treatment. See Tex. Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1 
(1989). Religion/nonreligion neutrality also comes up in the Establishment Clause cases that 
challenge programs that include religious beneficiaries among their classes of eligible 
participants. In those cases the Court has tended to uphold such programs on neutrality 
grounds even though they provide some subsidy to religious endeavors. See, e.g., Zelman v. 
Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002). 
17. Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 4, at 1803–04. For example, as the authors point out,
the Court has applied a strong, nonneutral separationist approach to cases involving state-
sponsored religious activity in public schools. See Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 
290 (2000); Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962). 
18. Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 4, at 1803. One need look no further than Locke v.
Davey, 124 S. Ct. 1307 (2004), decided this past term, holding that a state could 
constitutionally exclude theology students from a scholarship program for gifted students, to 
find positive proof of this assertion. As Justice Scalia noted in dissent in that case, the Court, in 
upholding the program, made “no serious attempt to defend the program’s neutrality.” Id. at 
1318, (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
19. Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 4, at 1803–04. For example, even as the Court was
holding that the Free Exercise Clause did not require religious adherents to receive special 
exemption from neutral rules of general applicability, it favorably cited the cases prohibiting 
civil courts from taking sides in religious disputes. See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 
872, 877 (1990) (citing Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem’l Presbyterian 
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said, however, there are significant considerations that suggest that 
the clergy-congregant sexual misconduct issue is not the type of 
matter that is properly outside of neutrality’s ambit.20
This Article will discuss whether Professors Lupu and Tuttle are 
correct in their assertion that clergy should not be subject to liability 
for misconduct with their adult congregants and whether the authors 
applied the appropriate construct in reaching this result. It concludes 
that while the authors reached the correct result, their reliance upon 
a constitutionally based structural-separation principle is misguided. 
Rather, the conclusion that clergy should not be subject to liability 
for misconduct with their adult congregants is more appropriately 
reached through the application of a neutrality model, which would 
suggest that sexual misconduct in clergy-congregant relationships is 
not actionable because current law does not subject secular leaders to 
similar liability for sexual relations with their followers. As we shall 
see, more may turn on which approach is used than simply the 
recognition that there can be multiple ways to achieve a common 
result. 
Part II of the Article introduces the issue by discussing some of 
the reasons that support holding clergy liable for sexual misconduct 
with adult congregants in scenarios similar to our opening 
hypothetical. Part III presents Professors Lupu and Tuttle’s thesis 
that principles of structural-separation prohibit civil courts from 
entertaining these types of sexual misconduct actions and raises some 
preliminary concerns about the authors’ approach. Part IV first 
analyzes the sexual misconduct issue under the neutrality model and 
demonstrates how this approach also leads to the result that clergy 
should not be found liable to their adult congregants for sexual 
misconduct. It then raises some of the problems inherent in the 
neutrality approach. Part V compares the two approaches and argues 
that the neutrality model offers the better alternative for resolving 
Church, 393 U.S. 440, 445–52 (1969); Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94, 95–
119 (1952); Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 708–25 
(1976)); see also Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679 (1871). 
20. The authors themselves offer a nod in this direction when they write: “We have
searched diligently and have found no decisions in which courts have deemed leaders of non-
religious voluntary associations to stand in fiduciary relationships with adult members of the 
association. If, as may be the case, the law is treating religious leaders differently, is such a 
disparity justified?” Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 4, at 1826. 
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clergy-congregant sexual misconduct issues. Part VI offers a brief 
conclusion. 
II. THE CASE FOR CLERGY LIABILITY FOR SEXUAL MISCONDUCT
WITH ADULT CONGREGANTS 
Although most consensual sexual relationships between adults 
are not actionable,21 there are exceptions. Therapists,22 physicians,23 
and divorce lawyers24 can be subject to civil liability (as well as 
professional sanctions) for engaging in sexual relations with their 
patients or clients.25 There is, obviously, a common theme with 
respect to these types of relationships: In all the instances noted 
above, there is a power imbalance between the two parties to the 
relationship.26 One party comes into the relationship because she 
needs help with a particular matter; the other comes into the 
relationship because he has the expertise and ability to provide that 
help. One party provides confidential information about herself; the 
other party discloses no similarly revealing details. The first party, 
because of her needs, is vulnerable; the second party, because he is 
the source of assistance, is in control. 
Clergy-congregant relationships can reflect a similar imbalance 
even when the relationship does not involve one-on-one or small 
group counseling. People seek religion to find meaning, comfort, 
21. Hertel v. Sullivan, 633 N.E.2d 36, 39 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994).
22. See David M. Dince, Malpractice Actions Against Therapists by Patients Alleging
Sexual Relations, N.Y.L.J., Mar. 9, 1994, at 1. 
23. The liability of physicians to their patients for their sexual relationship is not
categorical and will generally depend upon the degree the relationship involves therapeutic 
counseling. See Atienza v. Taub, 293 Cal. Rptr. 454, 457 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987) (noting that a 
sexual relationship between physician and patient will provide “a basis for a malpractice action 
only where the patient has alleged that the physician induced sexual relations as part of the 
therapy”). 
24. Doe v. Roe, 681 N.E.2d 640, 650–51 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997) (stating that a claim
against an attorney for breach of fiduciary duty by coercing the client into a sexual relationship 
is an actionable claim). 
25. Some states may even impose criminal liability for such action. See, e.g., COLO. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 18-3-405.5(1)(a) (West 2003); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.345(h)–(j) (West 
2003). See generally Michael T. Barruso, Sexual Abuse by Psychotherapists: The Call for a 
Uniform Criminal Statute, 17 AM. J.L. & MED. 289 (1991) (noting the extent of civil and, in 
some states, criminal liability for such transgressions by physicians and calling for greater 
criminal accountability). 
26. See D.E.M. v. Allickson, 555 N.W.2d 596, 604 (N.D. 1996); Fenton, supra note 5,
at 58–67; Villiers, supra note 5, at 46–48. 
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and moral guidance, and clerics are the voices through which the 
religion advises its adherents on these matters. Moreover, because 
the existential matters addressed by religion are among the most 
troubling and consequential components of the human condition,27 
religious adherents often look to clerics to provide some clarity in an 
otherwise incomprehensible universe.28 The cleric, accordingly, can 
touch the deepest needs of his congregants even when speaking to 
them only from the pulpit. This is not to say that all religious 
believers are vulnerable and all clerics are seen as all-powerful to their 
followers, but certainly in most traditions29 the laity will look up to 
those holding religious office as having religious insights and 
understanding that they do not possess. Thus, even though a cleric 
speaking from the altar or casually talking to a congregant, as in our 
opening hypothetical, may not have been entrusted by that 
congregant with the personal knowledge that a patient provides to 
her therapist, the fact that he will be seen as working in the service of 
God may nevertheless provide him with an extraordinary influence. 
The power imbalance between cleric and congregant, moreover, 
is not easily overcome. Certainly, congregants, if they choose, can 
separate the man from the cleric in the way they react to his actions 
and supplications. But the power of faith, for many, may not always 
be so easily divisible. The entreaty of the cleric in our opening 
hypothetical—that he needs the female congregant’s physical 
comfort to help him fulfill their religion’s mission—may not be a 
request that can easily be turned down by someone deeply 
committed to her church and religion. She will want her religion to 
succeed. She will not want to believe that her religion is being led by 
someone who would choose to exploit her. The trust she extends to 
her cleric, therefore, may not be all that different than the trust 
extended by the patient to her therapist. 
27. See RUDOLPH OTTO, THE IDEA OF THE HOLY 59 (John W. Harvey trans., 2d ed.
1950) (describing humanity’s existential fear as “the starting-point for the entire religious 
development in history”). 
28. Cf. PETER L. BERGER, THE SACRED CANOPY: ELEMENTS OF A SOCIOLOGICAL
THEORY OF RELIGION 58 (1969) (noting that humanity’s need for meaning may become 
“even stronger than the need for happiness”). 
29. Some religions, of course, do not have this sort of hierarchy. The Quakers, for
example, subscribe to “a sort of radical equality of relationship among church members.” 
Tracey L. Meares, Norms, Legitimacy and Law Enforcement, 79 OR. L. REV. 391, 405 (2000). 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [2004 
1928 
III. CLERGY LIABILITY FOR SEXUAL MISCONDUCT UNDER THE
LUPU/TUTTLE STRUCTURAL MODEL 
A. The Lupu/Tuttle Position
Professors Lupu and Tuttle do not contest the point that clergy 
may exercise inordinate power over congregants in certain instances 
and that clerics may be able to use that power for sexual exploitation. 
Nevertheless, they conclude that absent any indicia of a counseling 
or other similar, nonreligiously-based professional relationship, a 
member of the clergy should not be found liable for any sexual 
misconduct with one of his adult congregants. Importantly, the 
authors do not base this claim on ecclesiastical immunity premised 
on the defendant’s role as a religious actor.30 Rather, Professors 
Lupu and Tuttle base their conclusion upon the structural principle 
they perceive as grounded in the Establishment Clause; specifically, 
that the state may not adjudicate matters involving religious polity or 
theological judgment.31 Accordingly, the cleric’s defense to the civil 
claims based on sexual misconduct is jurisdictional. Because some of 
the elements of these actions require the mediation of internal 
religious matters, the civil courts have no competence to decide the 
issues involved. 
Working from this premise,32 the authors are able to explain why 
their theory would reject a plaintiff/congregant’s claim for breach of 
fiduciary duty.33 They contend that a fiduciary breach claim could 
30. Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 4, at 1816–19.
31. Id. For a similar view of this restraint, see generally Carl H. Esbeck, The
Establishment Clause as a Structural Restraint: Validations and Ramifications, 18 J.L. & POL’Y 
445 (2002). 
32. The structural-separation principle also allows Professors Lupu and Tuttle to quickly
dismiss the argument that sexual misconduct with parishioners may subject a cleric to an action 
for clergy malpractice. The problem with such a theory, they explain, is that, like all 
malpractice claims, it would require inquiry into whether the defendant breached his duty of 
care. The problem, however, is with how a court is to determine what constitutes reasonable 
care by a cleric in the pursuit of his calling. Such an inquiry, the authors contend, with strong 
precedential support, would improperly require the state to make judgments that can only be 
made from within the religious tradition. Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 4, at 1816 (citing Nally v. 
Grace Cmty. Church, 47 Cal. 3d. 278 (1988)). 
33. The authors identify the elements required to establish a fiduciary relationship as
follows: “The vulnerability of one party to the other which results in the empowerment of the 
stronger party by the weaker which empowerment has been solicited or accepted by the 
stronger party and prevents the weaker party from effectively protecting itself.” Lupu & Tuttle, 
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not be constitutionally applied to the clergy-congregant context for 
two reasons. First, one element of the action, determining the 
plaintiff.’s vulnerability to the cleric, would necessarily require a 
prohibited inquiry into the extent to which this vulnerability was 
based on her religious faith.34 Second, because fiduciary theory 
requires that both parties must intend to enter into a fiduciary 
relationship, a court would need to examine the parties’ religious 
understanding of their relationship in order to determine whether 
there has been the requisite intent.35 Such an inquiry would again 
require a forbidden investigation by the civil court into religious 
meaning.36
Professors Lupu and Tuttle do not contend that a cleric should 
never be found liable to a congregant for sexual misconduct; indeed, 
they argue that liability is appropriate when the sexual misconduct 
arises from a counseling relationship between the cleric and 
congregant that takes on attributes similar to a secular therapist-
patient relationship.37 Thus, liability may be found in circumstances 
when, for example, the clergyman has undergone training in therapy, 
held himself out as a qualified therapist, and induced a patient to rely 
on his expertise.38 Similarly, it might also be triggered when the 
cleric has engaged in a regular course of counseling sessions with a 
congregant, has offered her personal—as opposed to spiritual—
advice, and has some knowledge that the congregant may be 
especially vulnerable to exploitation.39 The key to the cleric’s liability, 
however, must be based on nonreligious factors. As the authors 
state, “[a] fiduciary relationship between clergy and congregant must 
be grounded in something other than its religious character.”40
supra note 4, at 1826 (quoting Langford v. Roman Catholic Diocese, 677 N.Y.S.2d 436, 438 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1998)). 
34. Id. at 1827–28.
35. Id. at 1827.
36. Id.; see also Richelle v. Roman Catholic Archbishop, 130 Cal. Rptr. 2d 601 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2003). 
37. Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 4, at 1821–24, 1827, 1830–31.
38. Id. at 1821–24.
39. Id. at 1821–32.
40. Id. at 1828.
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B. Potential Problems Within the Lupu/Tuttle Approach
Professors Lupu and Tuttle’s thesis that clergy should not be 
liable to congregants for sexual misconduct can be questioned from a 
number of angles. First, a breach of fiduciary duty claim may not 
truly fit within their structural theory.41 Contrary to their assertion, 
determining whether a fiduciary relationship existed between a cleric 
and congregant may not require deciding internal church matters of 
theology or polity.42 Rather, reviewing whether the particular 
relationship at issue rose to fiduciary status may only require the 
court to investigate the subjective religious understandings of the 
two parties involved.43 In this respect, consider Thomas v. Review 
Board.44 Thomas involved a Jehovah’s Witness who claimed that the 
Free Exercise Clause prevented the state from denying him 
unemployment compensation solely because, on account of his 
religious beliefs, he refused to accept work in an armaments factory.45 
The state contended that his belief was personal and not religious 
and introduced evidence that the Jehovah’s Witnesses’ doctrine did 
not prohibit its adherents from armaments work.46 To the Court, 
41. The structural-separation approach does, however, more comfortably encompass the
clergy malpractice action because, as we have seen, the basis of such a suit would depend upon 
a jury determination of a reasonable cleric within a particular religious tradition. 
42. Professors Lupu and Tuttle briefly address this argument by contending that
looking at the subjective views of the plaintiff would “effectively—and unconstitutionally—
discriminate[ ] against religious defendants by imposing fiduciary obligations on them through 
the unilateral action of the alleged beneficiary,” or alternatively that if “the plaintiff and 
defendant disagree about the religious meaning of the relationship, the court will need to 
decide between the rival understandings,” an inquiry which the authors allege would require 
the court to determine the “’true’ theological meaning of . . . [the] relationship.” Id. at 37. 
The authors do not consider, however, that a court could look solely to the subjective 
understandings of both parties. 
43. See Moses v. Diocese of Colo., 863 P.2d 310 (Colo. 1993) (noting that a fiduciary
relationship between a cleric and congregant may be determined by reviewing the specific 
factual circumstances of the case rather than by concluding that fiduciary relationships exist 
between clerics and congregants as a matter of law). 
44. 450 U.S. 707 (1981).
45. Id. at 709–13. Thomas remains good law even after Employment Division v. Smith,
494 U.S. 872 (1990). In holding that the Free Exercise Clause did not require that religious 
adherents be exempted from neutral laws of general applicability, Smith distinguished Thomas 
(and the other unemployment compensation cases that had held that the Free Exercise Clause 
did mandate constitutionally based religious exemptions) on grounds that unemployment 
compensation laws were not neutral laws of general applicability because they allowed 
claimants to be excused from work requirements for nonreligious reasons. Id. at 879–83. 
46. The lower court had in fact held that the claimant’s belief was not religious but was
philosophical. Thomas, 450 U.S. at 713. 
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however, the relevant issue was only the subjective belief of the 
individual Witness and not the sect’s official tenets.47 Whether 
Witness doctrine prohibited or allowed armaments work was beside 
the point.48  
Thomas thus suggests that a court could rule on the nature of the 
cleric’s and congregant’s personal religious beliefs regarding the 
nature of their relationship without ruling on official church doctrine 
or polity. That is, any fiduciary duty between the parties could be 
constructed based on the subjective beliefs of the parties rather than 
on the official doctrine of the church. As such, a clergy-congregant 
sexual misconduct case based upon breach of fiduciary duty would 
not implicate structural concerns because no civil court adjudication 
of an internal church matter would be necessary to reach a 
decision.49 To be sure, the inquiry into the nature of the parties’ 
religious beliefs may be constitutionally sensitive in that it will 
require determining when a belief is religiously based,50 but this 
inquiry would be necessary under the structural-separation approach 
in any case.51
Second, the implications of Professors Lupu and Tuttle’s 
assertion that a structural constitutional limitation may prevent civil 
courts from investigating the nature of religiously based relationships 
47. Id. at 715–16.
48. Id.
49. Moses, 863 P.2d at 321.
50. See United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n.2 (1982) (Stevens, J., concurring)
(noting that evaluating the merits of religious claims raises the risk that “governmental 
approval of some and disapproval of others will be perceived as favoring one religion over 
another”); United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 86–87 (1944) (holding that a finder of fact 
may not judge the sincerity of a person’s religious beliefs by judging the reasonableness of 
those beliefs). 
51. For example, the authors’ conclusion that a cleric may be found liable for sexual
misconduct when he provides secular counseling will require constitutionally sensitive line 
drawing between what constitutes secular and what constitutes religious counseling. Lupu & 
Tuttle, supra note 4, at 1828–32. The authors suggest that lines might be drawn on the basis 
of factors such as whether the cleric’s advice was personal as opposed to spiritual in nature, but 
the clarity of such distinctions is questionable. Id. at 1830–32. To many clerics and 
congregants, the differences between advice on personal and spiritual matters will be anything 
but distinct. In such circumstances, how is a court to define when counseling by clerics is 
religious and when it is not? See George C. Freeman, The Misguided Search for the 
Constitutional Definition of “Religion,” 71 GEO. L.J. 1519 (1983) (noting the inherent 
difficulties in defining religion). How is a court to decide whether or not to believe a cleric 
who states he believes that his counseling was religious in nature? Cf. Ballard, 322 U.S. at 92–
93 (Jackson, J., dissenting) (noting the inherent difficulties in determining religious sincerity). 
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may extend further than the authors intend. Specifically, it may 
throw into doubt the validity of the priest-penitent privilege, which 
can also require civil courts to determine religious issues. Consider 
the decision in In re Murtha.52 In that case, a nun refused to testify 
regarding a statement made to her by a suspect in a homicide case 
and, as a result, was held in contempt.53 The critical question posed 
by the case was whether her position in the Catholic Church entitled 
her to raise the testimony privilege—a question that required the 
court to consider such matters as whether she carried on “any of the 
religious functions of a priest,”54 what “religious aspect she attached 
to her relationship with individuals such as [the suspect],”55 and 
whether there was “anything in Catholic doctrine or practice that 
would give [her] the right to claim the priest-penitent privilege.”56 
These, of course, are exactly the types of question that Professors 
Lupu and Tuttle claim cannot be considered by a civil court hearing 
a sexual misconduct case against a member of the clergy. Yet, if such 
issues cannot be adjudged by civil courts for liability purposes, why 
can they be decided in determining whether a clergy-congregant 
relationship gives rise to a testamentary privilege? Either the 
prohibition on civil courts deciding religious issues is not complete, 
or the priest-penitent privilege is constitutionally suspect.57
Third, the authors’ claim that the structural-separation principle 
is grounded exclusively in the Establishment Clause and is 
jurisdictional can be criticized on several grounds.58 Supreme Court 
52. 279 A.2d 889 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1971).
53. Id. at 890–91.
54. Id. at 892.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 893.
57. Indeed, because Professors Lupu and Tuttle’s approach is absolute in application, it
would not allow the priest-penitent privilege to be sustained even as a permissible 
accommodation. Cf. Corp. of Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (1987) (upholding a 
religion-specific statutory exemption from Title VII as a permissible legislative exemption). 
58. This issue is not purely academic. There are significant implications depending upon
which constitutional provision the Court relies. The current Establishment Clause test does 
not allow purported infringements to be overcome by the presence of a compelling state 
interest. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612–13 (1971) (holding that, to pass 
Establishment Clause muster, a law must (1) have a secular purpose, (2) neither promote nor 
inhibit religion, and (3) avoid excessive entanglement in religious matters). The state, however, 
can impinge an individual’s free exercise rights if its action is supported by a compelling state 
interest. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 533–34 
(1993). 
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precedent, for example, does not support this contention. In the 
intrachurch property dispute cases relied upon by Professors Lupu 
and Tuttle in developing their structural-separation theory, the 
Court has never held that the prohibition on civil courts resolving 
such disputes on the basis of their interpretations of church doctrine 
depends upon the Establishment Clause alone.59 Rather, in its first 
decision holding that the rule was constitutionally based,60 the Court 
relied only on the Free Exercise Clause.61 More recently, it reached 
this result by resting on the First Amendment generally.62 This is not 
to say that there are no reasons that support the authors’ contention 
that the prohibition against civil court resolution of religious issues is 
based on antiestablishment concerns. For the state to delve into the 
meaning of church doctrine could be seen as violating the principle 
of nonentanglement in Establishment Clause jurisprudence,63 and to 
hold that one side in an intrareligion dispute represents the “correct” 
religious position could also be seen as “establishing” that position.64 
But the reasons suggesting this prohibition stems from the Free 
Exercise Clause are also substantial. The limitation on civil courts 
mediating internal religious issues serves both to insulate existing 
religious beliefs from government interference and to protect the 
further development of those beliefs,65 and in that sense protects the 
‘free exercise’ of those beliefs. Moreover, as I have argued 
59. See Scott C. Idleman, Tort Liability, Religious Entities, and the Decline of
Constitutional Protection, 75 IND. L.J. 219, 223–25 (2000); see also Patty Gerstenblith, Civil 
Court Resolution of Property Disputes Among Religious Organizations, 39 AM. U. L. REV. 513 
(1990). 
60. Prior to holding that civil courts are prohibited, on constitutional grounds, from
resolving religious disputes, the Court reached a similar understanding under the common law. 
See Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679 (1871). 
61. Kedroff v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94 (1952).
62. Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595 (1979); see also Arlin Adams, Jones v. Wolf: Church
Autonomy and the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 1291 (1980). 
63. See Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997).
64. Douglas Laycock, Towards a General Theory of the Religion Clauses: The Case of
Church Labor Relations and the Right to Church Autonomy, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 1373, 1382 
(1981). 
65. As Douglas Laycock has explained, “[w]hen the state interferes with the autonomy
of a church, and particularly when it interferes with the allocation of authority and influence 
within a church, it interferes with the very process of forming the religion as it will exist in the 
future.” Id. at 1391; see also Kathleen A. Brady, Religious Organizations and Free Exercise: The 
Surprising Lessons of Smith, 2004 BYU L. REV. 1633 (arguing that the rights of religious 
institutions to develop and maintain their autonomy over matters of belief and polity are based 
in the Free Exercise Clause). 
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elsewhere,66 the Establishment Clause seems a peculiar reed to serve 
as a foundation for constitutional defenses to enforcement actions 
taken against the church or religious leaders. To ‘establish’ normally 
connotes support, endorsement, or aid—not regulation.67
More problematic than its Establishment Clause label, however, 
is the characterization of the structural-separation principle as 
jurisdictional. The effect of the conclusion that the rule is 
jurisdictional is absolute: civil courts are completely forbidden from 
resolving all internal religious matters. No Supreme Court decision 
has gone this far, nor could it, if civil courts were to retain any role in 
resolving intrachurch disputes. The avoidance of religiously laden 
issues by civil courts in intrachurch property disputes is simply 
impossible. For example, even under the approach in intrachurch 
property disputes that is most designed to keep the civil courts out of 
internal religious matters—the rule requiring virtually complete 
deference to the decisions of hierarchical churches announced first in 
Watson v. Jones.68 and later in Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth 
Blue Hull Memorial Presbyterian Church.69—the civil court must still 
first decide an issue of internal religious polity—namely, whether the 
church in question is, in fact, hierarchical.70 There is no way out. 
Certainly, limiting the ability of civil courts to mediate internal 
religious matters is supported by strong constitutional 
considerations, but characterizing the limitation as jurisdictional is 
unrealistic.71 It may also, as in the priest-penitent example noted 
above, foreclose a more balanced analysis of the competing interests 
at stake. 
Despite these concerns, however, the Lupu/Tuttle position that 
a cleric should not be liable to a congregant for sexual misconduct 
may, in the end, be correct—at least in result. The reason, however, 
may have less to do with the authors’ explanation that an exceptional 
religiously based structural constitutional constraint applies in this 
66. William P. Marshall & Douglas C. Blomgren, Regulating Religious Organizations
Under the Establishment Clause, 47 OHIO ST. L.J. 293 (1986). 
67. Id.
68. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679 (1871).
69. 393 U.S. 440, 445–52 (1969).
70. Kent Greenawalt, Hands Off.! Civil Court Involvement in Conflicts over Religious
Property, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1843, 1877 (1998). 
71. Kent Greenawalt, for example, describes the constitutional effort of keeping civil
courts out of religious affairs not as an absolute rule but rather as a “sound aspiration.” Id. at 
1846. 
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area than it does with a more simple explanation—that such a result 
is mandated by the model of religion/nonreligion neutrality that 
permeates First Amendment jurisprudence. It is to this possibility we 
now turn. 
III. CLERGY LIABILITY FOR SEXUAL MISCONDUCT UNDER A
NEUTRALITY MODEL 
A. The Policies Underlying Neutrality
As noted previously, the central premise of the neutrality 
approach is that religion and nonreligion are indistinct for 
constitutional purposes.72 The policy reasons underlying this 
approach are straightforward. In a modern, pluralistic world in which 
religion is but one type of ideology among many, there can be no 
categorical claim that religion holds a special place in the minds of its 
believers.73 As Professors Christopher Eisgruber and Lawrence Sager 
argue, “religious conscience is just one of many strong motivations 
in human life, and there is no particular reason to suppose that it is 
likely to matter more in the run of religious lives generally than will 
other very powerful forces in the lives of both the nonreligious and 
religious.”74 Professor Frederick Gedicks, in turn, in addressing 
whether special constitutional exemptions for religious exercise 
72. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
73. See generally Eisgruber & Sager, supra note 15, at 1291–1301 (1994) (noting the
centrality of secular belief); Fredrick M. Gedicks, The Religious, the Secular, and the 
Antithetical, 20 CAP. U. L. REV. 113 (1991). But see Stephen D. Smith, The Rise and Fall of 
Religious Freedom in Constitutional Discourse, 140 U. PA. L. REV 149 (1991) (arguing religion 
is qualitatively different from other ideologies); John H. Garvey, An Anti-Liberal Argument 
for Religious Freedom, 7 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 275, 278 (1996) (same). 
74. Eisgruber & Sager, supra note 15, at 1263. Neutrality has had its most dramatic
impact in Free Exercise cases. At one point, the constitutional rule concerning free exercise was 
decidedly nonneutral. According to the Court in Sherbert v. Verner, 373 U.S. 398 (1963), 
burdens on an individual’s religious exercise could only be upheld if supported by the presence 
of a compelling state interest. Id. at 406. If the government failed to meet that burden the 
result was that the religious adherent would receive a constitutionally mandated exemption 
from the law at issue. Id. at 408–10. But this test raised an important question. Why should 
religious belief alone justify special accommodation? Gedicks, supra note 15, at 560; see also 
William P. Marshall, The Case Against the Constitutionally Compelled Free Exercise Exemption, 
40 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 357, 373–87 (1990). Eventually, the Court in Employment Division 
v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 878–80 (1990), abandoned the compelling interest inquiry in favor of
a test that reflected religion/nonreligion neutrality. Henceforth, free exercise claims would not
be recognized when they challenged neutral laws of general applicability that incidentally
burdened religious beliefs or practices. Id.
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should be required under the Free Exercise Clause, reaches a similar 
conclusion based upon basic notions of equality.75 Professor Gedicks 
poses the following hypothetical: 
A church and a secular nonprofit organization both want to 
operate a homeless shelter in violation of local zoning regulations. 
What would be the justification for granting the church an 
exemption from the regulations, but not the secular nonprofit? A 
Sabbatarian refuses to work on Saturday for religious reasons. An 
agnostic refuses to work on Saturday because he is a noncustodial 
parent, and Saturday is the only day his children are available to 
visit him. What would be the justification for constitutionally 
excusing the Sabbatarian from the obligation to make herself 
available for work as a condition to receiving unemployment 
benefits, but not the noncustodial parent?76
To Professor Gedicks, no justification supports such disparate 
treatment. As he states, “[t]here no longer exists a plausible 
explanation of why religious believers—and only believers—are 
constitutionally entitled to be excused from complying with 
otherwise legitimate laws that burden practices motivated by moral 
belief.”77
B. The Neutrality Model and Clergy Liability for Sexual Misconduct
Accepting, then, that the neutrality model is supported by strong
policy considerations, how should the clergy-congregant sexual 
misconduct issue be decided under this approach? The answer is not 
complicated. If leaders of secular organizations are not liable for 
having sexual relations with members of their organizations then 
clerics should not be held liable for having sexual relations with their 
congregants.78
Like the structural-separation model, however, the neutrality 
approach can be subject to serious objection. First, and most 
obviously, applying a neutrality model to the sexual misconduct issue 
might be criticized for ignoring that there is something unique in 
75. See Gedicks, supra note 15, at 566–68.
76. Id. at 555–56.
77. Id. at 574. Similar arguments have been made with respect to the inequality of
singling out religion for special disfavored treatment under the Establishment Clause. See 
Volokh, supra note 15, at 365–-73. 
78. Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 4, at 1821.
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the cleric-congregant relationship that differs from its secular 
counterparts. As discussed previously, clerics may be seen as more 
powerful in relation to their congregants because they are potentially 
viewed as directly in the service of God, or congregants may be seen 
as more vulnerable because people often seek religion for comfort 
and solace.79 Certainly clerics can hold enormous sway over members 
of their congregations. To many, the religious leader is seen, in the 
popular vernacular, as a “man of God;” and even if he is not 
considered a direct representative of deity—as in some religions—a 
religious leader may be the key individual congregants trust to 
convey religious messages. Saying “no” to a person to whom one 
looks for comfort, meaning, and the keys to salvation may not be the 
same as saying “no” to the local chapter leader of the Sierra Club. 
Being asked to provide strength to a person to help in his saving of 
souls may be harder to turn down than being asked to help persons 
save endangered species.80
Perhaps so, in some cases, but this is precisely where the 
contemporary turn to rejecting any inherent distinctiveness of 
religion comes into play. In a world in which nonreligious beliefs and 
affiliations are as central to some individuals as religious beliefs and 
affiliations are to others, neither the power of the religious leader nor 
the vulnerability of the congregant can be viewed as presenting 
categorically different considerations than that which occurs in 
parallel secular relations.81 True, some congregants may see their 
religious leaders as especially powerful, but some members of secular 
organizations may view their leaders as having similar majesty. True, 
some believers may seek religion because of their own personal 
vulnerabilities, but others may seek involvement in secular 
movements for the same or similar reasons. To return to the 
environmental leader/follower example, the fact is that for some 
individuals the belief in the sanctity of the environment is equivalent 
79. See supra notes 26–28 and accompanying text.
80. The reluctance to turn down a member of the clergy may be heightened in this
context because the personal qualities of religious leaders can strengthen and solidify the beliefs 
of their followers to the point where the follower sees her faith as inextricably tied to her 
congregation’s leader. See, e.g., Gayle White & Don O’Briant, Atlanta Archdiocese Details Sex 
Abuse Policy, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Aug. 6, 2003, at 1A (quoting the policy of the Roman 
Catholic Archdiocese of Atlanta, which states: “[Sexual abuse by Priests] is even more tragic 
when its consequence is a loss of the faith that the Catholic Church has a sacred duty to 
foster.”). 
81. See supra note 74 and authorities cited therein.
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in depth and commitment to the belief that other individuals have in 
religious matters. The clergy-congregant and secular leader-follower 
relationships, in short, cannot be categorically distinguished. 
Second, a more nuanced version of this objection might be to 
suggest that the claim to distinctiveness between religion and 
nonreligion presented by the clergy sexual misconduct example is 
not based upon a notion of distinctiveness between religious and 
nonreligious belief; rather, it is based on a claim that the power of 
religion vests in religious leaders a greater influence over others than 
does the power of secular beliefs. Certainly, there are many instances 
(some quite unfortunate) that suggest that religious leaders hold 
unique power over their followers.82 But contemporary experience 
also suggests that religious leaders are not alone in commanding 
inordinate power over their followers.83 And, to draw a parallel to 
our opening hypothetical, a charismatic environmental rights leader, 
for example, who tells one of his wide-eyed followers that he needs 
her physical comfort in order to have the strength to pursue his 
world-saving mission may exert as much power over her as our cleric 
did over his congregant. 
Third, one may object that in comparing the clergy-congregant 
relationship with that of a secular leader-member relationship, we 
have drawn the wrong parallel. The corresponding secular 
relationship to clergy-congregant should not be the leader-member 
but, rather, the therapist-patient relationship that is actionable under 
the civil law. That is, clergy should be seen as comparable to 
therapists in all circumstances and not only when they are offering 
secular-type therapeutic services such as individual counseling.84 
After all, as discussed in Part I, the power imbalance present in the 
clergy-congregant relationship can be even greater than that found 
in the therapist-patient context, even when the clergy-congregant 
relationship does not involve personal counseling or therapy. 
Accordingly, if secular therapists can be sued for sexual misconduct, 
82. See, e.g., Anna Borzello, A Party, Prayers, Then Mass Suicide, GUARDIAN (London),
Mar. 20, 2000, at 3 (noting the devastating affect of the power David Koresh and Jim Jones 
held over their followers). 
83. See, e.g., Tracey Tyler, Charles Manson Parole Hearing to be Telecast Live, TORONTO
STAR, Apr. 21, 1992, at C15 (discussing the “hypnotic hold” Charles Manson had on 
members of his so-called “family”). 
84. As discussed earlier, Professors Lupu and Tuttle raise no religion clause objection to
clerics being held liable for sexual misconduct when they act, in effect, as secular therapists. See 
supra notes 7–9 and accompanying text. 
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clergy should be subject to suit as well, even if their only relationship 
with the congregant is from the pulpit. 
The problem with drawing this parallel, however, is that it again 
simply restates the claim of religious distinctiveness. The reason the 
therapist-patient relationship is accorded legal significance is that the 
power of the attachment between the two parties is recognized as 
categorically exceptional and not the norm among secular 
relationships.85 Thus, the clergy-congregant relationship could be 
considered parallel to the therapist-patient relationship only if it is 
also considered categorically exceptional. By definition, however, the 
neutrality model rejects the premise that there is something 
inherently different between religion and nonreligion because, even 
if there are times when religion and religious belief can be said to 
exert a special influence over its adherents, there will also be times 
when nonreligious belief can have similarly extraordinary influence 
and/or times when religion will have no such power at all. Under 
the neutrality model then, the cleric sermonizing from the pulpit is 
seen as exerting no greater power over the members of his 
congregation than the environmentalist preaching in front of the 
polluter has over his crowd of followers. Unless all leader-follower 
relationships are said to raise heightened obligations, the comparison 
of the clergy-congregant to the therapist-patient relationship is 
inapposite. Only if the cleric was, in fact, acting as a secular therapist 
or counselor would the neutrality model allow liability to attach.86
Finally, it could be argued that the neutrality model should be 
rejected as the appropriate tool for analyzing clergy-congregant 
sexual misconduct because the power of religious leaders to 
manipulate their followers should be seen as raising special concern. 
Thus, under this approach, the cleric might be subject to liability for 
85. See, e.g., Ronald J. Maurer, Ohio Psychotherapist Civil Liability for Sexual Relations
with Former Patients, 26 U. TOL. L. REV. 547, 548–53 (1995) (describing the relationship as 
one in which the therapist is acutely aware of the patient’s vulnerability). 
86. Because it would allow liability in such circumstances, the neutrality model raises
concerns similar to the structural-separation model in its implementation. In determining 
whether a particular cleric has acted in the capacity of a secular therapist in his relationship with 
his congregant, the same sort of constitutionally problematic investigation that exists under the 
structural-separation model will be necessary to determine liability. Did the cleric act as a 
secular therapist or as a religious counselor? As discussed previously, this may require drawing 
difficult lines in determining the difference between religious and therapeutic counseling and a 
constitutionally sensitive inquiry into the nature and sincerity of the religious claims at issue. 
See supra notes 7–9 and accompanying text. 
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misconduct with his congregant even if a secular leader could not be 
subject to liability for sexual misconduct with one of his followers. 
There is precedent for permitting some disfavored treatment of 
religion under the Constitution. The Establishment Clause prohibits 
government endorsement of religion but not other ideologies87 and 
part of the justification in support of this special treatment, as I have 
argued elsewhere, is based on concerns relating to the special power 
that religion may exert over its followers.88  
Nevertheless, it is one thing to claim that religion may be subject 
to special disability in its relation to government and quite another 
that it should be subject to disfavored treatment in tort. The former, 
after all, raises broad societal concerns of (1) limiting the divisiveness 
that might occur along religious lines if the power and imprimatur of 
government was seen as a prize that could be captured by sectarian 
mobilization and/or (2) the fear that religious persecution might 
result if the enforcement powers of government were tied to the 
agenda of one religion.89 The latter, on the other hand, pertains only 
to the manner in which the individual intersects with her religion 
and in that sense more closely parallels the claim for special 
treatment of religion that has been rejected in the free exercise 
context.90 To return to Professor Gedicks’s example from free 
exercise jurisprudence to illustrate this point, the claim that a 
congregant, because of her religious convictions, is more vulnerable 
to her cleric than a passionate environmentalist is to her secular 
leader holds no more resonance than the claim that a Sabbatarian 
who is forced to work on Sunday suffers greater pain or anxiety than 
the noncustodial parent, who if forced to work on Saturday, loses 
visitation with his children.91 In short, if the claim that religion has 
special power over its adherents is accepted in the clergy-congregant 
sexual misconduct context, it would suggest that the neutrality 
approach should be abandoned in all areas, including those such as 
free exercise, in which its application is well settled.92 It is not an 
argument for special treatment of religion only in sexual misconduct 
cases. 
87. William P. Marshall, The Inequality of Anti-Establishment, 1993 BYU L. REV. 63.
88. William P. Marshall, The Other Side of Religion, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 843 (1993).
89. Id.
90. See supra notes 73–77 and accompanying text.
91. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
92. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 877 (1990).
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IV. STRUCTURAL-SEPARATION OR NEUTRALITY?
Although, as we have seen, both the structural-separation and 
neutrality analyses support the conclusion that there should be no 
liability for clerics who engage in sexual misconduct with their adult 
congregants, they do so based on opposing justifications. These 
reasons may be worth a brief review. First, the two models diverge 
on whether religion should be seen as distinct from nonreligion for 
constitutional purposes. Under the structural-separation model, 
clergy are protected from liability because the religious nature of the 
clergy-congregant relationship places special constraints upon civil 
courts resolving disputes that arise out of that relationship.93 Under 
the neutrality model, on the other hand, clergy are protected because 
the religious nature of the clergy-congregant relationship is deemed 
to have no special legal significance.94
Second, the structural-separation model is jurisdictional. It 
contends that civil courts do not have the competence to decide the 
internal religious matters that may be necessary to resolve the breach 
of fiduciary duty claim. The neutrality approach, on the other hand, 
is based on the merits. It concludes that claims of breach of fiduciary 
duty against clerics should be dismissed because the law does not 
recognize parallel claims brought by followers of secular 
organizations against their leaders. 
Third, because the structural-separation model is jurisdictional, 
its effects are absolute. The structural-separation model extends 
beyond clergy-congregant sexual misconduct claims and applies to all 
other matters that require civil court mediation of religious issues. As 
such, it casts into doubt whether legal provisions such as the priest-
penitent privilege can be constitutionally recognized because that 
issue too requires the resolution of internal religious issues, and it 
even suggests that the current limitations on civil court review of 
internal church property disputes do not go far enough because they 
93. See supra notes 31–36 and accompanying text.
94. There is, of course, considerable irony in this approach. Religion is protected from
liability because of its legal insignificance rather than its significance. This irony, however, 
reflects the pattern in First Amendment jurisprudence generally. For example, when the Court 
held in Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981), that the state could not prohibit prayer 
groups from using college classrooms otherwise open to secular organizations, it had to 
conclude that from a free speech perspective there was nothing especially significant about 
prayer. Prayer was no different than any other kind of speech, be it about morality, philosophy, 
or the fortunes of the school’s football team. 
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allow for some court adjudication of internal church matters. The 
neutrality model, on the other hand, is more flexible and would thus, 
for example, not categorically invalidate legal provisions such as the 
priest-penitent privilege on grounds that the prohibition of 
mediating religious issues is absolute95 and would continue to allow 
some civil court intervention into internal church disputes. 
With these differences in mind, then, it may be possible to 
determine whether structural-separation or neutrality offers a better 
approach to the clergy-congregant sexual misconduct issue.96 In 
making this comparison, let us assume, for the moment, that the civil 
law would allow actions to be brought by the followers of secular 
groups against their leaders for sexual exploitation. Thus, to return 
to an earlier example, when the environmental leader tells his female 
follower that he needs her physical comfort to help him succeed in 
his mission, we can assume the law now provides that he is opening 
himself up to potential liability based upon a newly constructed 
leader-follower fiduciary duty.97 Should the civil law now recognize a 
claim by a congregant against a cleric who has behaved in a similar 
manner? 
Presumably, if the civil law were to change in this manner, the 
response of both the neutrality and structural-separation approaches 
in the case of clergy-congregant sexual misconduct would be clear. 
The neutrality model would suggest that clerics should also be held 
liable. The structural-separation approach, on the other hand, would 
continue to preclude liability because the courts would not be free to 
inquire into the religious nature of the relationship.98
95. The priest-penitent privilege itself could be challenged under a neutrality theory
because, as a religiously based measure, it is not neutral in the sense that there are no parallel 
privileges recognized for nonreligious organizations. The neutrality approach, however, is not 
rigid and allows legislative accommodation for religion in some circumstances. See Corp. of 
Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 335 (1987) (upholding the constitutionality of a 
religion-specific legislative scheme); see also Greenawalt, supra note 70, at 1906 (noting that 
the neutrality approach in free exercise law does not prohibit granting religion legislative 
exemptions). 
96. Of course, in reaching any conclusion, we should keep in mind Kent Greenawalt’s
observation in his work on the related issue of civil court mediation of intrachurch property 
disputes that no approach is likely to be fully satisfactory. Greenawalt, supra note 70, at 1905. 
97. See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
98. This assumes that the parties’ beliefs about the nature of the relationship continue to
play a role in determining whether a fiduciary duty exists. If our new leader-follower fiduciary 
duty depends solely on the status of the parties and not their beliefs regarding the significance 
of the relationship, then the type of inquiry forbidden by the structural-separation model 
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Which is the better result? The answer, I believe, is neutrality. 
Not only because it is more flexible in application, but, more 
importantly, because it is supported by central notions of equality 
and fairness.99 To reverse Professors Lupu and Tuttle’s earlier 
rhetorical question: If the leaders of nonreligious voluntary 
associations are deemed to stand in fiduciary relationships with adult 
members of their associations, why should the law treat religious 
leaders differently?100
The answer is that it should not. Special exemptions for religion 
should not come in through the back door. Professors Lupu and 
Tuttle, of course, would respond that special exemptions are not the 
issue—the only reason that civil courts cannot hear the sexual 
misconduct claims is jurisdictional and has nothing to do with 
whether religion is entitled to constitutionally compelled favored 
treatment. As we have seen, however, the jurisdictional argument is 
not compelling. The fact that civil courts address internal religious 
matters is unavoidable.101 Alternatively, the authors might argue that 
the policies prohibiting civil court mediation of internal religious 
matters are sufficient to require that clergy-congregant misconduct 
issues not be analyzed under a neutrality approach—an argument 
that again is not based on favoritism. But even this argument should 
not be successful. As Professors Lupu and Tuttle themselves point 
out, the general rule in religion clause cases is neutrality, and anyone 
seeking to deviate from the neutrality approach bears the burden of 
showing the variation to be warranted.102 In the case of the clergy-
congregant sexual misconduct issue, the burden has not been met.103 
would not be required and the action presumably could continue. Even then, however, there 
might remain sensitive religious issues about who is a leader and who is a follower. 
99. See Gedicks, supra note 15, at 568–72.
100. Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 4, at 1821–22.
101. See supra notes 43–56 and accompanying text.
102. See Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 4, at 1802–04.
103. Neutrality would presumably also not recognize civil actions based upon claims of
clergy malpractice because clergy malpractice is a religion-specific action and is therefore not 
neutral. A more difficult problem might occur if the civil law recognized a “leader malpractice” 
tort applicable to leaders of nonreligious organizations. Could such an action also be applied to 
religious leaders? Admittedly, the hypothetical is a stretch. It is hard to imagine how a claim of 
“leader malpractice” would be stylized. Nevertheless, if such a tort were fashioned (and one 
should never underestimate the ability of the civil law to generate new torts) then presumably, 
under the equality approach, similar claims of malpractice could be brought against religious 
leaders. The constitutional question would then be to what extent such an action requires a 
determination of the “reasonable religious leader” standard. 
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The structural-separation policy is counterbalanced by the equality 
interests at stake. Sexual misconduct by religious leaders with their 
congregants should lead to no more, and no less, liability than sexual 
misconduct by nonreligious leaders with their followers. 
V. CONCLUSION
Sexual Misconduct and Ecclesiastical Immunity, by Professors Ira 
C. Lupu and Robert W. Tuttle, sets forth an important and
comprehensive theory of clergy and religious institution liability for
sexual misconduct. Relying upon a theory of structural-separation,
the authors contend that civil court review of such disputes must be
limited in order to avoid enmeshing the courts in matters of internal
church doctrine and polity. Thus, they conclude in an important
example that civil courts should not recognize a breach of fiduciary
duty claim for sexual misconduct against a cleric brought by one of
his adult congregants because to do so would require civil courts to
determine the religious nature of the underlying relationship.
Although the authors may be correct in result, their approach 
can be questioned. In contemporary religion clause jurisprudence, 
the dominant mode of analysis has been neutrality and the essential 
question whether religion and nonreligion are being treated equally 
with respect to the matter at issue. In the case of clergy-congregant 
sexual misconduct, the neutrality approach would also lead to the 
conclusion of no liability,104 but despite the common result, the 
choice of method is significant. If one were to take Professors Lupu 
and Tuttle’s structural-separation principle to its logical conclusion, 
it would mean that civil courts do not have the power to recognize 
matters such as the priest-penitent privilege or to engage in any 
resolution of internal church property disputes. The law does not, 
and should not, go that far. More importantly, the Lupu and Tuttle 
approach would also transgress the basic sense of equality and 
fairness between religion and nonreligion that underlies the 
neutrality principle; it would continue to immunize clergy from 
liability if the law were to change and allow secular leaders to be 
subject to actions for sexual misconduct. Religious and nonreligious 
leaders, however, should not be treated differently when they engage 
in sexual relations with their followers.
104. This is because secular leaders are not subject to liability for similar conduct with
members of their associations. See supra note 20 and accompanying text. 
